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Intergenerational Earnings Mobility and the Inheritance of Employers* 
 
Our analysis of intergenerational earnings mobility modifies the Becker-Tomes model to 
incorporate the intergenerational transmission of employers, which is predicted to increase 
the intergenerational elasticity of earnings. About 6% of young Canadian men have the same 
main employer as their fathers but this is positively related to paternal earnings and rises 
discretely at the top of the distribution. We use a switching regression model and identify two 
regimes associated with the inheritance of employers that have different intergenerational 
earnings elasticities. The model also demonstrates that the inheritance of employers plays a 
role in understanding observed nonlinearities. 
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A growing literature addressing the intergenerational transmission of earnings often 
forms the backdrop for policy discussions dealing with equality of opportunity. This 
literature is generally framed in the context of a linear regression to the mean model, and 
motivated theoretically by models of parental investments in the human capital of their 
children as in Becker and Tomes (1986, 1979) and Loury (1981). The major concern of 
the empirical research has been the challenge of correctly estimating the elasticity of 
earnings between parents and their children in the presence of measurement errors and 
life cycle biases. Solon (1992, 1989) and Zimmerman (1992) offer a starting point that 
has led to a large number of studies from a number of countries, surveyed by Björklund 
and Jäntti (2008), Corak (2006), and Solon (2002, 1999), with Böhlmark and Lindquist 
(2006), Grawe (2006), and Haider and Solon (2006) offering some of the most recent 
methodological developments. 
 Though this research is highly descriptive it has also led to a greater appreciation 
of causal processes. Attention to sibling and neighbourhood effects, as in for example 
Björklund et al. (2002), Björklund, Lindahl, Plug (2006), Oreopolous (2003), and the 
research summarized in Solon (1999), suggests that within family, as opposed to peer or 
neighbourhood, influences play the central role in determining the degree to which a 
child’s life chances are tied to socio-economic background. As such these findings have 
links to the growing research on early childhood development, the formation of values 
and preferences, and their impact on readiness to learn and pro-social behavior that are 
important antecedents to educational attainment and ultimately labour market success.  
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 While this certainly relates to discussions of equality of opportunity there at the 
same time seems to be less emphasis on the structure of labour markets, the constraints or 
barriers embedded in them, and access to particular occupations or jobs, issues that 
traditionally also spoke to this policy concern. In fact, studies of the demand side of the 
labour market describe persistent differences in wages across firms and industries, as for 
example in Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis (1999) who examine wage differences between 
small and large firms or in Krueger and Summers (1988) who discuss inter-industry wage 
differences. These studies and an associated literature documenting within industry firm 
differences, as for example in Baldwin (1998), suggest that more productive and more 
highly-paid workers are concentrated in particular firms.  
On the supply side it is also well-known that on the supply side families and 
friends play important roles in the job search process. Linda Datcher Loury (2006) 
suggests that up to 50% of jobs are found through family, friends or acquaintances, and 
also shows that the highest wages are paid to those who find jobs through “prior 
generation male” relatives who actually knew the potential employer or served as a 
reference. In this US study roughly 10% of men found jobs in this way.  
If the demand side of the market is structured into high and low paying firms and 
if close family relatives play an important role in passing on jobs, then is it possible that 
the degree of intergenerational earnings mobility has something to do with not only 
human capital investment when children are young, but also with the firms with which 
they are employed as adults and the possibility that these firms are in some sense 
inherited? This is the question that motivates our research. Our analysis of 
intergenerational earnings mobility focuses on the role that parents may play in 
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structuring the child’s interface with the labour market, in the extreme influencing the 
degree to which employers are passed on across the generations. We examine this issue 
with a large administrative data set on a cohort of Canadian men containing information 
for both fathers and sons on up to four employers per year, starting in the year the child 
was 15 years old and continuing to early adulthood. 
We show that the intergenerational transmission of employers influences the 
intergenerational transmission of earnings in these data. In the first part of the paper, 
section 2, we draw on Mulligan (1999, 1997) to derive a number of insights from a 
reformulation of Becker and Tomes (1986). This analysis motivates our empirical model, 
and argues that parent-child earnings will be causally linked even in the context of perfect 
capital markets if employers are transmitted across the generations. Under a reasonable 
parameterization of the model the possibility of inheriting an employer raises the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity, also suggesting a nonlinearity that varies positively 
with paternal earnings. This analysis also motivates the use of a particular version of a 
switching regression model in our empirical analysis, which is pursued along with a 
description of the data in sections 3 to 5 of the paper. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
The general structure of models dealing with the intergenerational transmission of 
inequality involves a two period horizon in which parents use their income both for 
consumption and for investment in their children during the first period, while children 
work and consume as adults in the second period. Parents care both about own 
consumption in the first period and about some measure of their child’s welfare—income 
or utility—in the second period. Their maximization problem involves allocating their 
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endowment between current consumption and expenditures that will increase the earnings 
capacity, and hence future well-being, of their children.  A simplified linear version of 
the earnings generating function for the child in adulthood, as presented in Becker and 
Tomes (1986), is offered as equation (1). 
ln Yt = γt Ht + λ Et + lt (1) 
The earnings of an individual of generation t are represented as Yt , and reflect the human 
capital of the individual Ht , its valuation in the labour market γt , and market luck lt . 
Human capital is assumed to be homogenous, and the total amount accumulated is 
proportional to the amount accumulated during childhood, reflecting the private 
expenditures of parents and the child’s endowment, Et. The latter, Et , is thought of as 
ability, reflecting in most of this literature the cultural or genetic attributes of the family 
that are passed on to the child in a way not determined by parental control, and hence not 
responsive to incentives.  
These endowments are assumed to be transmitted mechanically across 
generations according to a Markov process as given by, to use notation similar to Becker 
and Tomes (1986), equation (2). 
Et = αt + hEt-1+ vt (2) 
Parents observe the endowments of their children, and make human capital investments 
that are subject to a diminishing marginal return. All parents are able to make the optimal 
investment notwithstanding their income or the ability level of their children if capital 
markets are assumed to be perfect. This assumption permits even low income parents of 
high ability children to make the optimal level of investment. In this way the human 
capital and hence earnings outcomes of children are separated from parental income, and 
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the intergenerational transmission of inequality is determined by the degree to which 
ability is transmitted across the generations, as given by h.1 The fact that earnings regress 
to the mean according to the inheritability of endowments, and independently of parental 
earnings, is a key result in this strand of the literature. 
Standard models of the transmission of earnings across the generations also 
predict that parent-child earnings will be correlated for reasons other than the 
intergenerational transmission of endowments. In Loury (1981) and Becker and Tomes 
(1986) it is recognized that some parents may not be able to invest the optimal amount of 
human capital in their children if there are borrowing constraints in financial markets that 
prevent the passing on of debt for repayment in the next generation from the increased 
earnings of the child. Parents must fund these investments by reducing their own 
consumption. This implies that the cost of funds are not the same across families, and 
also that they are increasing in the level of expenditures on the child’s human capital as 
the reduction in consumption raises the shadow cost of additional expenditures. This is 
reflected in equation (3) by the positive influence of parental income in the educational 
attainment of children. 
Ht = δ Et + θ lnYt-1 , θ ≥ 0 (3) 
Equation (3) refers to the behaviour of parents potentially constrained in the capital 
market. When θ > 0 capital markets are not perfect so that the child’s level of human 
capital depends on parental income. The child’s level of human capital is higher the more 
able the child, but also the higher the income of the parents. The incomes of some 
families will be high enough to make the optimal level of expenditures, but this will not 
                                                 
1 As Mulligan (1997) makes clear this also assumes that parental preferences are homothetic and therefore 
that the degree and nature of intergenerational altruism implies linear expansion paths. 
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be the case for other families. In the presence of borrowing constraints, earnings will 
persist across generations both because of inheritable endowments and because of sub-
optimal human capital investments. In other words, imperfect capital markets imply that 
child earnings will be related in a causal sense to parental earnings. 
 We augment this model by introducing the possibility of intergenerational 
transmission of employers. Following Mulligan (1999, 1997 pp. 55-7), we suggest that 
endowments have two dimensions: one that shifts the earnings function in a way that 
alters marginal returns and determines the efficient level of human capital; another that 
shifts it in an additive way and does not alter its slope. We suggest that the 
intergenerational transmission of employers is an endowment of this latter sort, reflecting 
the capacity of parents to influence the outcomes of the child’s job search, and posit that 
this is positively related to parental earnings. 
Different hypotheses for the existence of a positive relationship between parental 
earnings and the intergenerational transmission of employers can be found in the 
literature. For example, Shea (2000), among others, hypothesizes that fathers in 
unionized jobs are able to pass on employment with the same firm to their sons. Further, 
the union-non union wage premium implies that the children of these relatively higher 
earning fathers will also get a relatively higher wage offer from the firm. More generally, 
Atkinson, Maynard and Trinder (1983) note that this tendency will also depend upon the 
diversity of the local labour market and the hiring practices of firms. When local labour 
markets are dominated by a single employer, it is more likely that sons would be 
employed at the same firm as fathers even in a non-unionized setting. Further, this being 
a dominant or large employer in the labour market may also suggest a dominant position 
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in product markets so that the firm’s revenues may incorporate a rent that is shared with 
workers. This suggests that there is a wage premium to be had by employment in this 
firm, reflecting the type of arguments used to understand persistent inter-industry wage 
differences or the higher wages paid by large, perhaps more productive, firms. 
The intergenerational transmission of employers could also be positively related 
to parental income because the degree of control parents have in the hiring policies of the 
firm may increase with income. In the extreme we can imagine parents being the owners 
of the firm and exerting preferential hiring of relatives. The literature on the succession of 
CEOs as in Pérez-González (2006) for the United States, and Bennedsen et al. (2007) for 
Denmark can be offered as an example of this possibility.2 
Finally, we also note that the possibility of inheriting an employer will impact the 
earnings outcomes of children through their reservation wage. In a simple one-sided job 
search model with infinite horizons, no search costs, and exogenous job offer arrival rates 






where Z is the value of non-
wage income, ω is the job offer arrival rate, ρ is the discount rate, and )(WF is the 
survivor function associated with the density of the job offer distribution. The possibility 
of inheriting an employer from a parent may increase job offer arrival rates from a 
particular firm as described in the previous paragraphs. But it might also impact upon the 
reservation wage. If this is the case, then the son’s adult earnings may be influenced by 
                                                 
2 The incidence of family based succession is high in the US data used by Pérez-González (2006), more 
than one-third of the slightly over 300 successions among publicly traded companies. As such this raises 
the possibility of nepotism as the mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of employers in a way 
that suggests a positive correlation with parental income. 
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the possibility of inheriting his father’s employer even if he does not ultimately work for 
this firm. 
 For a given job offer distribution the availability of a job in the father’s firm, 
something the child knows with certainty, will lead to higher reservation wages in the 
same way that the availability of an independent source of income like unemployment 
insurance increases the reservation wages of the unemployed. In other words, we assume 
that δZt / δYt-1 > 0, higher earning parents are employed by higher- wage firms, and 
therefore any potential job offers these firms extend to the adult children are higher 
paying. Since δWR/δZ = 1 / [1 + ω )( RWF / ρ] > 0, individuals with higher earning parents 
have higher reservation wages and therefore higher earnings.3 These earnings may well 
be obtained from firms other than the father’s firm, but the probability of same firm 
employment will rise with the reservation wage of the child. This probability is F(WR), 
where  F( ) is the associated cumulative distribution function. Since F(WR) increases 
monotonically in value with Z, the incidence of same firm employment is higher with 
higher Z. The probability of same firm employment approaches one at the highest 
possible values of WR, and if it is the case that Z increases monotonically with parent’s 
earnings this implies a much higher chance of same firm employment among the sons of 
highest earning parents. 
The possibility of being employed with the same firm that employed their parents 
is information available to children, and its impact on earnings is transmitted across the 
generations in a manner different than depicted in equation (2) for other endowments. In 
                                                 
3 See Lancaster and Chesher (1983, pp. 1664-65). This result holds if δF(W)/δZ = 0, that is if a marginal 




particular we suggest that the earnings generating function in equation (1) be modified as 
follows. 
ln Yt = γt Ht + λ Et +φ lnYt-1 + ut (4) 
In equation (4) earnings depend upon two types of endowments, ability Et and the 
earnings impact of parental job contacts represented as φ lnYt-1, whereφ > 0 indicates that 
fathers with greater earnings are more able to pass on employment in higher paying 
firms. The point is that Z influences the child’s reservation wage, and this is what is 
implied byφ lnYt-1 replacing the last term in equation (1). This becomes the realization of 
a draw from a conditional rather than an unconditional distribution, and as a result ut 
represents the remaining component of earnings due to “luck”.  
These equations imply that ln Yt = (φ  + γt θ ) lnYt-1 + (λ + γt δ) Et . So for children 
of the same ability Et , the child with higher earning parents will have higher expected 
earnings. This occurs for two reasons. First, higher income families are less severely 
constrained in the capital market. In the standard borrowing constraints model with one 
dimension of ability this effect is given by γt θ. But this impact is accentuated by the 
presence of the second type of endowment so that the ultimate elasticity between parent 
and child earnings for children with equal Et is (φ  + γt θ ). The presence of the 
intergenerational transmission of employers implies any given difference in income 
between parents of equally endowed children will lead to a higher difference in the longer 
run earnings of children because higher paid parents have a higher wage employer to pass 
on to their children. 
As in the standard formulation this framework motivates and informs the use of a 
linear regression to the mean model of intergenerational mobility: ln Yt = α + β lnYt-1 + εt , 
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where β, the intergenerational earnings elasticity, is the parameter of interest in need of 














This derivation clarifies that when both effects are in play, θ > 0 and φ > 0, the shape of 
the intergenerational earnings relationship is indeterminate. As such, nonlinearities 
cannot be used to test the predictions of the model without specifying how β varies across 
the population as a result of the existence of both credit market distortions and the 
transmission of job contacts.  
In the standard formulation φ =0, and the discussion distinguishes a regime in 
which capital markets are perfect, with θ = 0 and therefore β = h, from a regime in which 













= , which is greater than h  when θ is less than one. In Becker and Tomes 
(1986) this latter regime is described to be the case for low income families, and as such a 
direct channel is opened between the earnings of parents and their children making the 
intergenerational tie in earnings stronger than it would have been had the optimal level of 
human capital expenditures been made. This model predicts a non-linear and concave 
relationship between parent and child earnings, or alternatively in the context of a linear 
specification the intergenerational earnings elasticity for the population as a whole is 
higher than it otherwise would be, and is driven by the higher elasticity at lower income 
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levels. The two regimes, θ = 0 and θ > 0, are often distinguished by whether parents make 
financial transfers to their children or not, as in Mulligan (1999).4  








= , but in this case the higher intergenerational elasticity holds at higher 
earnings levels since those with higher earnings pass on another type of endowment to 
their children. In other words, this model also predicts a nonlinear relationship between 
the logarithm of parent and child earnings, but convex in nature with a higher elasticity at 
higher parental earnings because the children of these parents are both more likely to 
inherit an employer, and more likely to inherit a higher paying employer. In a similar 
manner this suggests that the population consists of a mixture of two types of individuals, 
and raises the issue of whether and how these regimes can be empirically identified.  
For empirical purposes the impact of the intergenerational transmission of 
employers on earnings cannot be identified by separating the sample into two groups 
based upon the observation of whether or not the son works at the same employer as the 
father. The observed incidence of same employers across the generations understates the 
influence of employer inheritance because sons of high enough ability may have an 
optimal level of human capital investment that would imply higher earnings with other 
employers. Nonetheless, the opportunity to inherit the father’s employer conditions their 
reservation wage and leads to higher earnings than their counterparts who are of equal 
ability and hold similar qualifications but who cannot inherit their father’s employer, or 
                                                 
4 Grawe (2004), Grawe and Mulligan (2002), Han and Mulligan (2001) point out that with heterogeneity in 
child abilities and parental altruism the relationship between parental income and being credit constrained 
is not straightforward and cannot be easily determined empirically. This in large part motivates Guo (2009) 
to frame this model in terms switching regressions with sample separation unknown or uncertain. 
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whose father’s are employed with a lower paying firm.5 As such information on whether 
a son actually works at the same employer as his father is not a perfect measure of 
whether or not the son had a possibility of inheriting an employer from his father, and 
this needs to be recognized in the empirical analysis. This is the challenge we address in 
the remainder of the paper. 
 
3. Nature of the data and some preliminary results 
Our analysis is based upon the Intergenerational Income Data (IID) we developed at 
Statistics Canada from administrative information on individual income tax returns that 
have been grouped into families. While we have information on a number of cohorts of 
young men, our focus is on the oldest group, those who are 33 years of age in the last 
year of observation. We observe their earnings in each year they file income taxes from 
the age 15 onward, and more importantly the earnings of their fathers since that time. For 
each year between 1978 and 1996 we also observe up to four employers that the sons and 
the fathers may have had. The appendix discusses the data in more detail.  
Table 1 presents basic descriptive information. Father’s earnings are averaged 
over the five year span in which the son was 15 to 19 years of age. To remain in the 
sample the father must have positive earnings in each of these five years.6 On average 
                                                 
5 For that matter the observed incidence of intergenerational transmission of employers could also overstate 
the influence on a child’s earnings in the sense that employers may be found independently of any parental 
role, particularly if labour markets are segmented geographically and there are only a few employers in the 
location for which job search occurs. If the allocation of employers were random there would be a 
possibility that some sons will work for the same employer as their sons, and this would have nothing to do 
with the job contacts and networks of the father that sons may rely on, with firm specific human-capital 
investments parents make in their children, or with nepotism. 
 
6 This is the preferred sample selection rule in Corak and Heisz (1999). They show that averaging over a 
five year horizon is long enough to correct for transitory earnings fluctuations. Mazumder (2005) suggests 
that almost twice as many years are necessary to correct for persistent transitory earnings fluctuations in the 
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fathers are in their mid forties when we estimate their permanent earnings. Sons’ earnings 
are averaged over a three year period, 1994 to 1996, conditional on reporting positive 
earnings in each of these three years. As such the sample of sons is relatively young. This 
is likely to lend a downward bias to estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity. 
This is one reason we focus most of our analysis on the oldest available cohort. This 
restriction also simplifies many of the calculations and makes the sample size—at just 
over 70,000—more manageable. 
We work with a particular definition of whether or not a son is employed by the 
same firm as his father. It refers to the “main” employer of the father and the son, the 
employer accounting for the majority of earnings. We restrict this to mean the employer 
representing the majority of the father’s earnings during the years the son was 15 to 19 
years of age, and the employer accounting for the majority of the son’s earnings when he 
was between ages 30 and 33. Just below six percent (5.9%) of this cohort of young men 
have as their main employer in adulthood the same main employer their fathers had when 
they, the sons, were between the ages of 15 to 19. 
In fact, the lifetime incidence of the intergenerational transmission of employers 
is much higher: 41% of 33 year olds are or have been employed at some point since the 
age of 16 with an employer who also employed their father at any point in the past.7 In 
other words, many more sons have at some point been employed with at least one of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
US administrative data he uses. However, unlike these US data the earnings information from the IID is not 
top coded. 
 
7 We  derive this figure by defining a vector of same-employer indicators that are set equal to one in year t 
if any of the son’s employers in year t were the same as any of the father’s employers over the period 1978 
to t-1 inclusive. This definition of the intergenerational transmission of employers involves up to four 
different employers per year for both sons and fathers. At age 33 it represents the life time incidence of the 
intergenerational transmission of employers showing whether the son at any point since the age of 16 had 
the same employer as his father back to the year they were 15. See Corak and Piraino (2010) for a more 
detailed discussion and analysis. 
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father’s employers than actually have a career job with the employer that gave their 
fathers a career job. This lends credence to the previous discussion of the job search 
process by suggesting that the possibility of same firm employment across the 
generations is greater than what is observed by focusing on the career employer in 
adulthood. 
The incidence of same main employer across the generations is positively 
associated with father’s earnings. Figure 1 presents the proportion of sons in each 
percentile of the father’s earnings distribution having the same main employer. For 
percentiles below about the 45th the incidence is for the most part below the overall 
average of 5.9%, while for percentiles above about the 55th it is above. Its highest values 
are among the top 3 percentiles, displaying a distinct jump to about 10% at the 98th and 
99th percentiles and then to almost 16% at the top percentile. 
Table 2 offers the quartile transition matrix between father and son earnings, as 
well as the proportion of sons with the same main employer as the father in each cell. 
Many of the cells in the middle part of the transition matrix are not too different from 
0.25, but the probability that sons born to fathers in the bottom quartile become bottom 
quartile adults is over one-third as is the probability of sons born to top quartile fathers 
becoming top quartile adults. What distinguishes these two points is the fact that the 
proportion observed to have the same employer as their fathers is much higher among 
sons of top earning fathers. About 4% of sons of bottom quartile fathers have the same 
employer as their father regardless of whether they remain at the bottom of their earnings 
distribution or move to the top. In contrast, only 3% of the sons of top earning fathers 
who fall to the bottom quartile have the same employer as their father; while close to 
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12% of those who remain in the top quartile have the same employer as their father. A 
similar pattern holds for those born to fathers in the third quartile, and to a lesser degree 
the second quartile. For the most part it is also the case that the upward movement of one 
quartile from the father’s original position is associated with a higher percentage of same 
firm employment than that associated with sons who remain in the same quartile as their 
fathers. Similarly downward mobility of one quartile is associated with a lower fraction 
of same firm employment than that associated with sons who remain in the same quartile.  
 
4. The Empirical Model  
Our objective is to estimate the intergenerational earnings elasticity by recognizing that 
the population of sons consists of a mixture of two groups, those who draw on parental 
job contacts and those who do not. The empirical strategy is to split the sample of 
families by the likelihood of having intergenerational contacts, and to assume separate 
linear models of earnings transmission for the two groups. Our theoretical discussion 
offers the logic behind this approach, namely that the group more likely to exploit 
parental networks should experience more intergenerational earnings persistence under 
the assumption of perfect capital markets. These families are identified by exploiting the 
information available in our dataset. 
Consider again the standard intergenerational earnings relationship ln Yt = α + 
βlnYt-1 + εt , but expressed as two distinct regression regimes: the first applying to 
individuals without intergenerational job contacts (say I = 0); the second to those with 












We can think of the system described by equations (6) and (7) as a switching regression 
model. Three types of switching regressions can be distinguished depending upon the 
information available for the indicator Ι . If Ι is observed with certainty, the model is 
characterized with a known sample separation and the two equations can be estimated 
separately. If Ι  is unobserved, the switching regression model has unknown sample 
separation, with each observation having an unknown probability p ≡ Pr(Ι  = 1) of 
belonging to regime 1, and probability 1 – p  of  belonging to regime 0. The econometric 
challenge, in this case, is to estimate the parameters β1 and β0 without knowing a priori 
which of the n values of the dependent variable was generated by which regime (Quandt, 
1972). When some information on Ι  is available but this information is only partial, the 
model is one of imperfect sample separation. In this case, the “true” regime is 
unobservable, but there exists a proxy measure, Z, which identifies the regimes with 
error. 
We focus on this latter case in order to recognize the degree of uncertainty with 
which our indicator of intergenerational transmission of employers discriminates the 
sample observations across the true underlying regimes. In other words, we take into 
account the fact that the subsamples of individuals working and not working for a past 
employer of their father (respectively with Z = 1 and Z = 0), will in effect be made up of 
mixed groups, with observations from both regimes (I = 0 and I = 1). This is the scenario 
studied in Lee and Porter (1984), who show that any misclassification will result in 
biased estimates of the β coefficients if the sample separation is treated as known.  
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We follow Lee and Porter (1984) as developed in Maddala (1986, pp.1646-8) and 
Guo (2009) to derive the likelihood function for the system of equations (6) and (7). 
Assuming that the error terms in the two regression regimes ε1 and ε0 are independently 
and normally distributed with mean zero and constant (though not necessarily equal) 





















  for i = 0,1 
from which the joint density of tY  and Z can be derived 
[ ] [ ] ZZt pfpfpfpfZYf −+−−+= 1 0001 1011 )1( )1()|(  (8) 
where  p1 = Pr(I = 1| Z = 1) and  p0 = Pr(I = 0 | Z = 0). Thus, the distribution of lnYt  is a 
mixture of two normal distributions, and is estimated by maximum likelihood under this 
assumption.  
The identification of the parameters in the likelihood function is reached when a 
priori information to distinguish between the two regimes is available (Lee and Porter 
1984, Guo 2009). In our case, we assume that those who work for the same employer as 
their father are more likely to be in the intergenerational job contact regime. That is, we 
assume that Pr(I = 1| Z = 1) > Pr(I = 1| Z = 0), and that Pr(I = 0| Z = 0) > Pr(I = 0| Z = 1) 
which implies that p1 + p0 > 1.
8  In our application the functional form of p1 and p0 is 
parametrized as a probit function Φ(γ0+γ1Z).  
   
5. Estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of earnings  
                                                 
8 Lee and Porter (1984) and Guo (2009) offer the proof of identification.  
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To fix ideas Table 3 offers the results from least squares estimation under the 
assumptions of no sample separation, and of exogenous and known sample separation. 
Least squares leads to an estimated intergenerational elasticity of 0.250. This is at the 
upper end of the range reported in the empirical literature for Canada using these data as 
well as Instrumental Variables estimators from survey data. This reflects our decision to 
focus on just the 33 year olds, the oldest cohort available to us.9 
When we assume that sample separation is exogenous and known the 
intergenerational elasticity for those with the same employer as their father is estimated 
to be just above 0.4, higher than any results from a linear specification reported in the 
Canadian literature. Table 3 also reports similar results for two different samples: one 
using the observations from the bottom 95% of the father’s earnings distribution, and 
another based upon the top five percentiles. We examine these samples separately 
because of the suggestion in Figure 1 that there is a distinct rise in the intergenerational 
transmission of employers at the very top of the distribution. This is also in line with the 
non-parametric results in Corak and Heisz (1999) that suggest a distinct non-linearity in 
the intergenerational earnings elasticity at the very top few percentiles of the father’s 
earnings distribution. The results in panel 4 show that for the top 5% of the father’s 
earnings distribution the difference in the estimated elasticities across regimes is larger.10 
We use the estimates reported in panel 2 of this table as starting values for the 
maximum likelihood estimation, the results of which are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for 
                                                 
9 When a cohort of 30 to 33 year olds is used we obtain an intergenerational elasticity of 0.224, which is 
more in line with other research (Corak and Heisz 1999, Fortin and Lefebvre 1997). Corak (2006) and 
d’Addio (2007) report that as such Canada is among the relatively more mobile countries for which 
comparable estimates are available, in particular an intergenerational elasticity of a little over 0.2 is about 
half as great than commonly reported for the United States. 
 
10  The differences between the two elasticities for each panel are respectively: 0.178 (0.021), 0.222 
(0.026), 0.389 (0.085), with the numbers in parentheses indicating the standard error. 
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each of three samples, and for sample separation unknown and known imperfectly. These 
models use the same main employer indicator as the imperfect classifier of the regime. 
Table 4 offers the switching regression estimates for the intergenerational regression to 
the mean model when sample separation is unknown. The results show significant 
differences between regimes and across the father’s earnings distribution. In the top two 
panels, regime 1 is associated with less intergenerational persistence of earnings, while 
the opposite is true when we focus on the top 5% of the father’s earnings distribution 
(panel 3). Since sample separation is unknown, we cannot attempt a theoretical 
interpretation of these findings. That is, we cannot identify which regime corresponds to 
the ‘job contacts regime’ from the perspective of our augmented Becker-Tomes model. 
We can say, however, that the data are consistent with the hypothesis that the samples are 
partitioned in two distinct regression regimes, and we can estimate the probabilities 
associated to each of them. About 60 percent of observations are associated with regime 
1 in panels 1 and 2, while for the top 5% of father’s earnings distribution (panel 3) the 
probability of belonging to regime 1 is estimated at 41 percent. 
In Table 5, we use the indicator of same main employer as a proxy for regime 
classification. As explained, the identification of regimes rests on the assumption that 
sons working for a former employer of their father are more likely to be in the “job 
contacts regime.” This proxy variable enters the likelihood expression in the probability 
function associated with each regime, Φ(γ0+γ1Z), so that the sign of the coefficient γ1 on 
the same main employer dummy identifies the regression regime corresponding to the 
presence of job contacts. Since the only difference in the likelihood function between the 
unknown and uncertain sample separation models is in the functional specification of the 
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probabilities associated with the regimes, we should not expect appreciably different 
estimates of the intergenerational coefficients in the two models. In fact, the results in 
Table 5 closely resemble those in Table 4. The only important difference is that in Table 
5 we are able to label regime 1 as the ‘job contacts’ regime because of its positive 
correlation with the intergenerational transmission of employers.  
In order to interpret the two-regime switching regression results in Table 5, we 
must specify how β varies in the population in light of our theoretical framework. The 
augmented Becker-Tomes model shows that in the context of imperfect capital markets 
the intergenerational earnings elasticity will be affected by both credit market distortions 
and parental job contacts. The results in Table 5 provide evidence of the existence of 
multiple regimes across the father’s earnings distribution, possibly as a result of the 
interaction between these two effects. Assuming that credit constraints are not binding for 
fathers in the top five percent of the distribution, the switching regression model in panel 
3 cleanly distinguishes the two theoretical regimes with respect to parental job contacts. 
That is, the intergenerational transmission of employers increases the earnings elasticity 
as predicted by theory when credit markets are perfect. When credit constraints are 
binding, the possibility to draw on parental employer’s network decreases the probability 
of being constrained. Since earnings persistence across generations is predicted to be 
higher among credit constrained families, the results in panels 1 and 2 could simply 
reflect the negative correlation between same firm employment and the susceptibility of 
being credit constrained. 
We replicated Table 5 in two alternative ways. We used the presence of paternal 
self-employment as well as a broader measure of same firm employment—ever having 
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been employed at the same employer as the father since the age of 16—as the proxy 
variables. These possibilities are drawn from the findngs in Corak and Piraino (2010) that 
having a self-employed father is associated with a much higher chance of same-firm 
employment across the generations, and that there is a significant degree of 
intergenerational transmission of employers when the entire available life cycle of the 
sons is examined. The results, which are not shown but available upon request, are 
essentially the same as those presented in Table 5, and confirm that all these proxies are 
acting to identify the regime. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In the standard model of intergenerational earnings mobility with perfect capital markets 
all adult children with the same human capital have the same endowment along the 
dimension that determines the optimal level of human capital investment. This implies 
that they all have the same anticipated earnings, which are unrelated in a causal sense to 
parental income. With earnings determined by two types of endowments this does not 
hold. In particular, we consider a model in which parental job contacts or firm-specific 
investments imply that some children will be employed with the same firm as their 
parents, and suggest that this is another endowment that directly influences the child’s 
earnings function. This type of endowment opens a channel for parental earnings to 
directly influence child outcomes, similar in kind to the role of imperfect capital markets 
in the traditional formulation, but different in the sense that the resulting higher 
intergenerational elasticity occurs at the upper—not the lower—end of the parent’s 
earnings distribution. This result follows from an assumption that the value of the 
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intergenerational transmission of employers to the earnings of children is positively 
related to parental earnings. 
This perspective suggests that the population is a mixture of two groups, those 
with the possibility of inheriting an employer from their fathers, and those without. As 
such the appropriate empirical strategy is to estimate the regression to the mean model in 
a switching regression framework. We use a large administrative based data set on a 
cohort of young Canadian men to estimate these models with sample separation 
unknown, and known imperfectly. 
 We document the fact that close to 6% of these young adults obtain the majority 
of their earnings from an employer who was also the main employer of their fathers some 
15 to 20 years earlier, when they were young teenagers.  Our empirical analysis 
recognizes that some sons who are never observed to have been employed at a firm that 
once employed their fathers may still have their reservation wages influenced by the 
possibility that they could have such employment. Others who are observed to have had 
such employment could have found the employer on their own without relying on 
information or contacts from their parents. As such we recognize that this is an imperfect 
indicator of regime type. Our maximum likelihood estimates account for this, and yield 
much higher estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity for those at the upper 
end tail of the father’s earnings distribution who have the possibility of working in the 
same firm as their fathers. The preservation of intergenerational earnings status across the 




Our research suggests that as the intergenerational earnings literature continues to 
address issues of causality it should also recognize that parents might invest in the 
success of their children throughout the course of their life cycle, not just in the early 
years. The structure of labour markets and the way in which young adults make the 
transition to their career job may also be an important part of the intergenerational 
dynamic determining their long-run attainments, an aspect that may be just as closely tied 
to issues of equality of opportunity. 
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Appendix on the construction of the data 
These data are also used in Corak and Piraino (2010) to discuss the intergenerational 
transmission of employers, and this appendix draws from their exposition. Canadians file 
their income tax returns (so-called T1 Forms) on an individual basis, and Statistics 
Canada has grouped these into families using a variety of matching strategies that are 
described in Harris and Lucaciu (1994). The resulting T1 Family File (T1FF) is the basic 
building block for the creation of the IID, an intergenerational linked set of T1 Forms for 
a series of cohorts of young men and women, and their mothers and fathers. This 
represents not quite four million individuals and their parents, and in particular 1.9 
million men who are the starting point for our research. We focus on the male cohort 
born between 1963 and 1966, and in fact for the most part the oldest subset born in 1963. 
These individuals are linked to their fathers—not necessarily their biological fathers—if 
they filed an income tax return between 1982 and 1986 while still living at home. This is 
required to ensure that a parent-child match is made, and also that the child has an 
observed Social Insurance Number (SIN), a unique individual identifier that can then be 
used to link all subsequent T1 Forms which contain information on earnings. These T1 
Forms are available for all years between 1978 and 1996.  
The algorithm used to create the data leads to an under-representation of children 
from lower income backgrounds, and from the major metropolitan areas: Montreal, 
Toronto, and Vancouver. This reflects the fact that children who leave home early or who 
otherwise are not engaged in the labour market while at home are less likely to be linked 
to a parent. It also reflects the fact that new immigrants and their children will be under-
represented in the data, the majority having a tendency to settle in the three major cities 
of the country. Weights based upon Census data have been created to account for this, 
and our analysis uses them throughout even though they make no difference to the 
results.  
The sample sizes associated with the creation of our analytical files are detailed in 
Appendix Table A1, which makes clear that they are large—measured in the tens and 
hundreds of thousands—given that the data potentially represent the universe of 
individuals in these age groups. 
Versions of these data have been used by Blanden (2005), Corak (2001), Corak, 
Gustafsson, and Österberg (2004), Corak and Heisz (1999), Grawe (2006, 2004), 
Oreopoulos (2003) and Oreopoulos, Page and Huff Stevens (2008) to study a host of 
issues dealing with intergenerational mobility. Our application is unique in that we 
further develop the data by adding information on the specific firms employing parents 
and children throughout the period they are observed. We do this by relying upon a 
longitudinally consistent catalogue of all enterprises in the country, linked to individuals 
through the earnings remittance forms issued to employees (the T4) and used to support 
their income tax returns. This database of firms is referred to as the Longitudinal 
Employment Analysis Program (LEAP). See Statistics Canada (1992, 1988) for a 
description of its construction and use. Each T4 has a payroll deduction account number 
unique to a firm, and the LEAP serves to aggregate the possibly many account numbers 
per firm into a single longitudinally consistent identifier. For each individual (fathers and 
sons), and for each year from 1978 to 1996 we obtain unique firm identifiers for up to 
four employers. Very few individuals ever have more than four different employers in 
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any given year. Using the individual’s earnings from each employer we designate for a 
given year the firm accounting for the majority of total earnings as the “main” employer 
in that year, or sometimes over a five year horizon according to our analytical needs. 
The LEAP offers an accurate representation of the private sector but our analysis 
of the intergenerational transfer of employers is hampered by the fact that it does not 
distinguish separate employers in the public sector. This refers to federal and provincial 
public services but not to municipal governments. For anything finer than a two digit 
industry analysis this will overstate the degree to which employers or industries are 
passed across the generations. In order to recognize this, we consider father-son matches 
in employment in the public service as missing information on same firm employment. 
Accordingly we note that the analysis offers conservative estimates of the degree of 
intergenerational job contacts. 
 
 
Appendix Table A1 






Weighted sample size 
 
   
Entire sample, all male cohorts 1,890,923 2,474,667 
   
1963 to 1966 male cohorts 653,959 886,099 
   
Fathers with positive earnings in each of five years 





   
Sons with positive earnings in each of three years 





   






   
Fathers born between 1908 and 1952  236,210 288,607 
   
Only 1963 cohort, those 33 years of age in 1996  71,125 84,343 
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Proportion of sons with the same main employer as their father for each percentile of the 
father’s earning distribution: father’s main employer when son was 15 to 19 years compared 
to sons main employer between 30 and 33 years of age 
   
  
 
 Note: The horizontal line is drawn at 0.059, the incidence of same firm employment for the entire sample. Calculations are based on 
weighted observations of 71,215 sons who are 33 years of age. Father’s earnings percentiles are calculated using a five-year average 
of earnings during the period sons were 15 to 19 years of age. 
 








Descriptive statistics for fathers and sons linked intergenerational 
 
        
 Number 
of 
Average Age Average Earnings Number of unique 
employers 




Fathers Sons Fathers Sons 
        
1  Entire sample 71,215 47.4 33 43,524 36,129 23,963 31,674 
  (6.14)  (27,085) (22,953)   
        
2. 95th percentile and 




33 39,724   
(15,377) 
35,434   
(20,904) 
23,070 30,378 
        




3,716 47.6   
(5.22) 
33 115,735  
(68,499) 
49,347   
(45,281) 
2,018 2,643 
        
        
Note: Panel 1 refers to all inter-generationally linked sons born in 1963, and who are hence 33 years of age in 1996. Fathers’ earnings 
are averaged over the five years the son was 15 to 19 years of age, and sons’ earnings are averaged between 1994 and 1996. All 
monetary figures are expressed as constant 1992 dollars. The cut-off dollar value of the 95th percentile of the father’s earnings 
distribution is equal to $79,910. The number of unique employers refers only to the main employer, the employer that paid the largest 






Quartile earnings transition matrix with proportions of intergenerational transmission of 




A. Father-son earnings quartile transition matrix 
 
  Sons 
 
 
Fathers Bottom 2nd 3rd Top 
     
Bottom 0.351 0.282 0.207 0.161 
2nd 0.267 0.277 0.254 0.202 
3rd 0.215 0.238 0.277 0.271 
Top 0.168 0.203 0.262 0.367 
     
     
     







Fathers Bottom 2nd 3rd Top 
     
Bottom 0.041 0.048 0.038 0.042 
2nd 0.027 0.059 0.067 0.061 
3rd 0.022 0.046 0.083 0.101 
Top 0.029 0.044 0.079 0.116 
     
     






Least squares estimates of a linear regression to the mean model of intergenerational 
earnings mobility: no sample separation, and sample separation exogenous and known 
 
   
Least squares estimates  
  Constant Coefficient Sample Size 
   
1. No sample separation 7.50 0.250 71,215 
   
2. Sample separation exogenous and known  
 No same main employer in adulthood 7.60 0.235  66,949 
 Had same main employer in adulthood  6.87 0.413  4,266 
   
3. Bottom 95% of father’s earnings distribution  
 No sample separation 7.48 0.249 67,499 
 Sample separation exogenous and known  
 No same main employer in adulthood 7.57 0.236 63,599 
 Had same main employer in adulthood 6.16 0.458 3,900 
   
4. Top 5% of father’s earnings distribution  
 No sample separation 9.17 0.248 3,716 
 Sample separation exogenous and known  
 No same main employer in adulthood 9.82 0.144 3,350 
 Had same main employer in adulthood  10.66 0.533 366 
   
    
Note: Table entries are least squares coefficient estimates based upon a linear regression to the mean model with the natural logarithm 
of son’s earnings averaged over three years (1994 to 1996) as the dependent variable, and the natural logarithm of the five year 
average of father’s earnings during the years the son was 15 to 19 years of age. The model also controls for the age and age squared of 








Maximum likelihood estimates of a switching regression to the mean model of 
intergenerational earnings mobility: sample separation unknown 
 
   
Maximum likelihood estimates  
 
 
  Constant Coefficient Sigma - ln L p 
      
1. Entire sample      
  Regime 0 6.26 0.335 0.693 -55,579 0.409 
  Regime 1 8.48 0.177 0.314  0.591 
       
2. Lower 95% of father’s earnings distribution      
  Regime 0 6.29 0.316 0.681 -52,279 0.403 
  Regime 1 8.49 0.177 0.315  0.597 
       
3. Upper 5% of father’s earnings distribution      
  Regime 0 9.18 0.096 0.318 -3,201 0.592 
  Regime 1 8.43 0.468 0.859  0.408 
       
 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates using a Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, with starting values given by 
least squares as presented in Table 3, panel 2. Standard errors are estimated using the Outer Product of the Gradient. Convergence was 
attained within 20 iterations. All coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The model also controls for the age and age squared of the 
father. All sons are 33 years of age in 1996. Sample sizes for panels labelled 1,2, and 3 are respectively: 71,215, 67,499, and 3,716. 
 







Maximum likelihood estimates of a switching regression to the mean model of 
intergenerational earnings mobility: imperfect sample separation  
 
   
Maximum likelihood estimates  
 
 
  Constant Coefficient Sigma - ln L p 
      
1. Entire sample      
  Regime 0 6.45 0.314 0.691 -55,378 0.409 
  Regime 1 8.40 0.187 0.314  0.591 
  γ1 = 0.7430  
       
2. Lower 95% of father’s earnings distribution      
  Regime 0 6.47 0.297 0.680 -52,058 0.405 
  Regime 1 8.44 0.184 0.315  0.595 
   γ1 = 0.8129  
       
3. Upper 5% of father’s earnings distribution      
  Regime 0 9.36 0.078 0.318 -3,200 0.591 
  Regime 1 8.28 0.485 0.860  0.409 
    γ1 = 0.2117  
       
 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates using a Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, with starting values given by 
least squares as presented in Table 3. Standard errors are estimated using the Outer Product of the Gradient. Convergence was attained 
within 20 iterations. All coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The model also controls for the age and age squared of the father. 
All sons are 33 years of age in 1996. Sample sizes for panels labelled 1,2, and 3 are respectively: 71,215, 67,499, and 3,716. 
 
The column labelled p refers to the probability associated with each regime, calculated as Φ(γ0)*Pr(Z = 0)+Φ(γ0+γ1Z)*Pr(Z = 1). 
 
 
 
